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In many countries the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological formations will probably begin in
near future. This will pose new challenges to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the rest of
the safeguards community. Final disposal plants should be under strict safeguards control, since spent
fuel, which has been cooled for several decades, has considerable proliferation potential. Safeguards
must be taken into account in project planning for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel at an early phase
to avoid unnecessary costs and delays in planning and construction. Early planning and open reporting
creates awareness, confidence and acceptability with respect to the project within IAEA and the rest of
the safeguards community.
The objective of this report is to describe the Finnish spent fuel encapsulation plant and encapsulation
process. The plant and process have been planned by Posiva ltd, the company responsible for spent fuel
management and disposal in Finland. The first plans for the facility and process are quite new, and
most details are still subject to changes. This report provides a good basis for design information
verification of the encapsulation facility and for further planning of safeguards implementation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The final disposal to of spent nuclear fuel into
geological formations is foreseen to begin in the
next decade, which brings new challenges to the
International Atomic Energy Agency and other sa-
feguards community. Finland is among those
countries, which have final disposal plans.
The viewpoint of safeguards must be taken
into account into the disposal project planning at
an early phase in order to avoid unnecessary costs
and delays in planning and constructing phases.
Open communication and discussion on the final
disposal plan—including safeguards issues—helps
to create and sustain confidence among public as
well as in safeguards community. Open discussion
will reveal more probably the weaknesses and
bring forth possible solutions to them.
Motivated by above-mentioned facts Finnish
Support Program for IAEA has launched a task:
Safeguards for Finnish spent fuel conditioning
plant. This task is limited only to the safeguards
issues of encapsulation process. The safeguards
problems of the final repository are not in the
scope of the task.
This report—Description of Finnish Spent Fuel
Encapsulation Plant and Encapsulation Process—
is the first outcome of the task. The accepted work
plan of the task is presented in the Appendix 4.
This report presents the encapsulation facility
and working procedures designed by Posiva ltd—a
company who is responsible for spent fuel man-
agement in Finland. The aim of this report is to
describe the planned disposal process in a way,
which gives the basis for further work in this task.
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2.1 Spent fuel accumulation and
management
At present Finland has four LWR type power reac-
tors at two NPP sites. Two BWR reactors are loca-
ted in Olkiluoto and two VVER 440 type reactors
are situated in Loviisa (see map in Figure 1). The
reactors have been running from the late 70’s–
early 80’s. Additionally, Finland has one research
reactor (FiR/TRIGA), locating in Helsinki area.
The Finnish once-trough fuel cycle is based on
from rock to rock ideology, where the spent fuel is
returned to the bedrock in specially designed and
made copper-lined steel canisters (Figure 2). The
objective is to permanently keep the radioactive
material apart from biosphere, although the re-
trieval of the spent fuel is possible. In 2020 total
amount of spent fuel from the present Finnish
reactors will be 2 600 t.
Posiva ltd is jointly established by nuclear
power companies in 1996. Its task is to provide
final solution for spent fuel management and
conditioning in Finland. Geological investigations
and final deposition process planning has been
performed in Finland from 1983.
2.2 Time schedule of the disposal
In May 1999, Posiva proposed that the final repo-
sitory would be built in Eurajoki near the Olkiluo-
to BWR (see the map in Figure 1). The initial
design of the encapsulation plant is on the way,
and the first report describing the details of the
plant has been made available in April 1999 (Kuk-
kola, 1999a). Also the underground tunnels, repo-
sitory holes, instrumentation and activities have
initially been designed. The final layout of tunnels
depends on geological conditions at the repository
site. In year 2000 Finnish parliament will make a
principal decision of final disposal plan presented.
Detailed investigations at the selected location
will be performed at 2000–2010 and the construc-
tion of the plant will take place in 2010–2020. The
operation of the plant will start in 2020.
2.3 Technical plan of disposal
Until 2020 spent fuel will reside in interim wet
storages locating at the power plant sites in Lovii-
sa and in Olkiluoto. Long-distance transports are
inevitable since only one repository will be built.
The fuel cycle in Finland after its removal from
the reactor is as follows:
1) Spent fuel is transferred to interim wet storage
locating at NPP site.
2 WASTE MANAGEMENT OF BACK-END
OF FUEL CYCLE IN FINLAND
Olkiluoto
(2 × BWR)
Loviisa
(2 × BWR)
Espoo
FiR
Figure 1. Finnish nuclear reactors.
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Figure 2. The final repository 500 m below the ground level and spent fuel canister.
Figure 3. The time schedule of Finnish spent fuel disposal project.
2) Spent fuel is allowed to cool for 20–40 years.
The cooling time is needed to facilitate the
encapsulation and disposal process. The
surface temperature of fuel canister must not
exceed 100 °C due to the properties of bentonite
clay used as buffer material in the repository
holes.
3) Spent fuel will be transported to encapsulation
plant.
4) Spent fuel cask is received at the encapsulation
will be plant and placed in the canisters, which
will be closed tightly.
LEVEL 0.00 Room area/m2 Height/m Volume/m3
1. Cask receiving and storage area 444 10.8 4795
2. Storage for new canisters 106 7.2 763
3. Hot cell 116 7.2 835
4. Capsulation process operating room 161 3.6 580
5. Component room of welding chamber 44 3.6 158
6. Welding chamber 46 7.2 331
7. Component room of inspection station 47 3.6 169
8. Bentonite block production plant 79 7.2 569
9. Lift foyer 24 7.2 173
10. Bentonite storage 75 7.2 540
11. Workshop 86 7.2 619
12. Storage 13 3.6 47
13. Storage 13 3.6 47
14. Storage 23 3.6 83
15. Back-up electricity room 58 3.6 209
16. Diesel room 52 3.6 187
17. Storage 27 3.6 97
18. Corridor 90 3.6 324
TOTALS 1504 — 10526
1
2
3
4
5
6 7
8
9
10
1112 13 14
15
16 17
18
APPENDIX 1 FLOOR PLANS AND ROOM LISTINGS OF THE ENCAPSULATION PLANT
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5) The canister is laid down and disposed to the
underground repository 500 m below the
ground level
6) When the disposal operations are finished, all
the tunnels and shafts are backfilled and the
encapsulation plant is decommissioned.
The phase 4 will take place at the encapsulation
plant and it consists of three main stages
1) Receiving and handling of spent fuel cask.
2) Hot cell operations, where fuel assemblies are
placed in canisters.
3) Closing, welding and quality control of the
canister.
These stages are described in more detail in chap-
ter 4.
Since Finland has two different types of power
reactors, two different types of canisters are need-
ed. BWR type of canister insert is cylindrical, and
it has length of 4,45 m and diameter of 95 cm. It
has 12 rectangular holes for spent fuel assemblies.
The canister is made of nodular cast iron, it has
copper lining, whose thickness is 5 cm. Copper
lining makes the canister chemically resistant,
and iron has good strength against mechanical
loads. VVER type canisters are similar to the
BWR type canisters, except their physical dimen-
sions are different (height 3,25 m) and the holes
for hexagonal spent fuel assemblies are circular.
The pictures of spent fuel canisters are in Figure 4
and 5.
Most likely the TRIGA fuel will be encapsulat-
ed the VVER or BWR canisters in the encapsula-
tion plant and placed in the same repository as
power reactor fuel.
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Figure 4. The schematic view of the inserts for BWR
and VVER 440 fuel assemblies (Raiko et. al. 1999).
Figure 5. The sections of the inserts for BWR and
VVER 440 fuel assemblies (Raiko et. al. 1999).
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3.1 General view of the
encapsulation plant
Final disposal facility will consist of many buil-
dings (encapsulation plant, work shaft building,
offices, district heat central, water utility, infor-
mation building etc.). Encapsulation plant and
work shaft building will have no operational con-
nections; therefore, they may be quite distant (se-
veral hundred meters) from each other. Encapsu-
lation plant is the only building where nuclear
material will be handled. Spent fuel will be trans-
ferred to the disposal facility by heavy trucks,
which can be driven through the encapsulation
building (see also Figure 7).
The encapsulation plant is not very large: 57 m
long, 37 m wide and 13.6 m high (maximum
dimensions). Total volume of the building will be
31 500 m3 and area of structure 1 900 m2. General
picture of the encapsulation plant is in Figure 6.
3.2 Floors and levels of the
encapsulation plant.
The plant will have five levels: –7.20 m, –3.60,
+0.00, +3.60, and +7,20 levels. Midlevels at –3,60
and at +3,60 levels are not covering the whole
area of the structure. +7.20 level contains only
facilities for air conditioning and a machine room
for the elevator. The most essential stages of en-
capsulation will be performed at the lowest level.
The floor plans of different levels and room lis-
tings are in Appendix 1.
3.3 Personal and material
connections
The controlled area is entered via underground
passage tunnel from encapsulation plant office.
Personnel and dosimetric checkpoints are in the
office building. Uncontrolled area is entered
through door and stairs locating beside the stora-
ge of new canisters. Visitors have an access to
service corridors at levels of –3,60 and +3,60, whe-
re they can follow the different steps of the encap-
sulation through radiation protected windows.
Empty canisters and spent fuel transport casks
are received at the ground level. They are trans-
ported with heavy trucks. Bentonite blocks are
either purchased from external supplier or manu-
factured in the encapsulation plant. The blocks
are laid down to the repository using the same
shaft that is used for canisters. If bentonite blocks
are produced in the encapsulation plant, the clay
will be moved using large containers weighing 21
tonnes. The estimated consumption of bentonite
clay is 40 tonnes per week.
Spent fuel canisters and bentonite blocks are
moved to underground repository by a canister
lift, whose payload is 30 tonnes. The production of
encapsulation plant is estimated to be 60 canis-
ters per year. Maximum capacity would be 100
canisters per year.
Personnel and machinery required for quarry-
ing and disposal in the underground depository
will not use the canister lift in the encapsulation
plant. They enter to the underground depository
through a work shaft tunnel whose entrance will
be located at the work shaft building.
3 PRELIMINARY DESIGN INFORMATION
OF THE CONDITIONING PLANT
The following information is mainly based on information from a working reports
of Posiva (Kukkola, 1999a and Kukkola, 1999b). These reports are available in
Finnish and the abstracts are available in English.
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Figure  6. General picture of the Finnish spent fuel encapsulation plant.
Figure 7. Spent fuel receiving and storage area.
This report presents a preliminary, detailed de-
sign of the encapsulation plant envisaged in the
final disposal programme of spent fuel of Posiva
ltd. The design information gives good basis for
design information verification. Possible diversion
scenarios can be identified and guidelines for ini-
5 CONCLUSIONS
tial safeguards approach can be suggested. Revie-
wing the design with present IAEA requirements
for conditioning facility and existing experience of
IAEA and EURATOM will give valuable informa-
tion for further improvements.
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4.1 Transport & receipt of spent
fuel and receipt of empty
canisters
New, empty canisters are received, stored and pre-
pared at the buffer store, which has room for 24
canisters. A subcontractor manufactures the ca-
nisters, and its operation must be subject to strict
safety and quality control.
The encapsulation plant will be able to handle
transport casks of Loviisa and Olkiluoto power
plants. Spent fuel from Loviisa power plant will be
transported using CASTOR VVER 400 cask,
which has transportation capacity of 84 VVER 440
assemblies. Transport cask of Olkiluoto will have
capacity of about 50 BWR assemblies. No final
decision about transport type, which can be either
wet (assemblies are in water inside the cask) or
dry, are not taken yet.
The casks are received at the spent fuel receiv-
ing and storage area. At the sides of corridor there
is a buffer store for 8 casks, 4 for both types. The
casks can be also stored outdoors, if needed. The
spent fuel receiving and storage area is shown in
Figure 7.
4.2 Handling of empty canisters
An empty spent fuel canister is lowered down from
the storage of new canisters to transfer corridor
on a remote-controlled track-wheeled transfer
trolley (see Figure 8). The trolley has lifting and
lowering mechanism of the canister. The trolley is
moved to a position under the hot cell, the canister
is lifted up and docked tightly into its docking
position.
The hot cell has one common docking position
for VVER 440 and BWR canisters. The docking
hole has a covering hatch, a hermetical atmos-
phere-changing cup for changing the air inside the
canister with inert gas, and a protective cone,
which is placed on the canister during the loading
to protect seals, bolts and welding. The atmos-
phere-changing cup has also electric screwdrivers,
and it is used as a tool for screwing in and out
bolts of the inner iron lid of the canister. After the
tightness of the junction has been assured of, the
internal covering hatch in the hot cell is opened.
The copper lid of the canister remains outside, but
the bolts of the iron lid will be opened and the lid
is lifted inside the hot cell.
4.3 Handling of the transport cask
Transport cask will be laid down to a transfer
corridor of the cask, which is located below the hot
cell. Walls and floor of the corridor are coated with
stainless steel liner and the chamber is equipped
with decontamination equipment and cleaning
system of discharge water. The outer lid of the
cask is opened, overpressure of the cask released
and the cask decontaminated, if needed. The cask
is moved under the hot cell, lifted upwards and
docked tightly into the docking position of the hot
cell, and the internal covering hatch of the hot cell
is opened. The bolts of the inner radiation protec-
tive lid of the cask are screwed out and the lid is
lifted inside the hot cell.
The inner radiation protective lid of the empty
transport cask will be replaced before the cask is
disconnected from the hot cell. Decontamination
of outer surface of the cask is performed in the
unloading chamber, if needed, but internal walls
of the cask are not decontaminated at the encap-
sulation plant. The inner lid of the cask is opened
only in the hot cell.
The picture about arrangements in the hot cell
is presented in Figure 9. Figure 10 shows a cross-
sectional view of the hot cell.
4 DESCRIPTION OF THE
ENCAPSULATION PROCESS
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Figure 10. Cross section of the hot cell (1) and adjacent rooms. Two cylinders (2) under the hot cell are
reservations for drying autoclaves, buffer positions and/or  measurement positions. Cask transport and
receiving area is on the left (3) and canister transfer corridor (4)  is below the hot cell on the right. A
canister shown in the transfer corridor has been docked into its position. Cask docking positions are not
shown in this figure.
Figure 11. Decontamination cell and tomographic inspection station.
Figure 8. Transfer trolley and transfer corridor of the canister.
Figure 9. Hot cell.
14
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4.4 Movements of spent fuel in
the hot cell
Inside the hot cell the assemblies are moved with
a remote controlled manipulator (Fig 9). The han-
dling of the assemblies will depend on the chosen
transportation method. If transportation will be
dry, the temperature of the assemblies is around
300 ºC. When the cask is opened the temperature
of the assemblies decrease quickly due to natural
convection. They are allowed to cool for 24 h befo-
re they are moved out of the cask. After the coo-
ling period the assemblies are moved into the veri-
fication position (chapter 4.7) and then into the
canister.
If transportation is wet, the assemblies must
be dried before they can be placed into the canis-
ter. Drying will take place in an autoclave, which
are electrically heated or thermally isolated posi-
tions embedded in the floor of the hot cell. The
autoclaves can also act as a buffer store for the
assemblies inside the hot cell. The hot cell has two
autoclaves, one for VVER fuel and another for
BWR fuel. Both autoclaves have 12 positions for
assemblies. When assemblies have been dried
they are moved into the verification position and
then into the canister.
4.5 Closing the canister
When the canister is full, the protective cone is
removed and cleanness of the surfaces and seals
are checked. The inner lid of the canister is repla-
ced and atmosphere-changing cup is moved on the
canister. Under the cup air is replaced with noble
gas (possibly helium) and the inner iron lid will be
screwed in. Then the cup is removed and the cove-
ring hatch is closed tightly, and the canister is
disconnected from the hot cell and lowered by the
transport trolley. The copper lid of the canister is
placed on the top of the canister in the transfer
corridor.
4.6 Leaking assemblies and
rejected rods
Leaking assemblies and rejected fuel rods are
packed in hermetically sealed capsules at the NPP
site. The capsules can be handled in the same
manner as fuel assemblies. The capsules are dis-
posed in the specially manufactured canister,
which has an enlarged position. The sealed capsu-
les are not opened in the encapsulation plant. If
an assembly starts leaking during the transporta-
tion or in the encapsulation plant, it will be placed
normally in the canister. The ventilation and de-
contamination systems in the hot cell have enough
capacity to filter the releases from a certain fracti-
on of leaking fuel rods to keep the radiation expos-
ure for employees and the public well under the
safety limits.
4.7 Operator measurements and
environmental monitoring
The hot cell is the only place inside the encapsula-
tion plant, where assemblies are moved separate-
ly. Therefore, it is the most preferable location to
perform detailed monitoring. During the encapsu-
lation, every assembly is identified and measured
with gamma or/and neutron monitors, and coo-
ling-time and burn-up data is compared with me-
asured data. Identification and cooling-time &
burn-up verification is necessary also in the view-
point of safety, since the thermal load of the canis-
ters is restricted. Current plans include a shielded
measurement position embedded in the floor of
the hot cell for measurements, but it is not shown
in the drawings. The measuring position needs to
be shielded, since otherwise radiation in the hot
cell from other assemblies in the cask and canis-
ters would disturb the measurements.
External dose rate and airborne radioactivity will
be controlled in the facility as well as in the envi-
ronment by operator and radiation safety authori-
ty. Personal doses of employees will be monitored
by dosimeters.
4.8 Welding and inspection of the
canister
The canister is moved to the welding station, whe-
re the copper lid is welded using electron beam.
EB-welding chamber is above the transfer corri-
dor likewise the hot cell. The canister is lifted by
the trolley and docked into the welding position.
After welding, the canister is lowered and trans-
ferred to machining and ultrasonic inspection sta-
tion, which is also situated in the corridor.
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Transfer corridor has two side corridors. The
first one is for decontamination of the canister,
which take place after ultrasonic inspection. After
decontamination the canister is moved to the x-
ray tomographic inspection station, which is locat-
ed in the second side corridor. The method produc-
es strong radiation field. Tomographic and ultra-
sonic inspection produces unique images from
welding seams of canisters, and it can be used as
identifier in later stage. Decontamination and
tomographic inspection cells are shown in Figure
11.
If a welded canister does not pass the quality
tests, the welding will be repaired. If the welding
is still unsatisfactory, the outer copper lid of the
canister is reopened with a circular cutter, the
canister is attached into the hot cell, and the
assemblies are removed. The canister is handled
as active waste, except the outer copper lid, which
can be recycled. Defective canister can also be
recycled filled with short or medium-lived active
instruments (neutron sources, core instruments of
the reactor etc.). When the inner lid of the canis-
ter is screwed in the waste package is ready for
disposal. The flow diagram of canister is shown in
Figure 12.
4.9 Buffer storage
After accepted quality control tests the canisters
are washed, the weld surface is ground and the
canisters are moved to buffer storage, which is
located behind protective walls. The storage has
room for 12 canisters. Finally, canister is moved to
the lift and lowered down to the underground re-
pository.
4.10 Time schedules of the
encapsulation process
The encapsulation process has three main stages:
1) Spent fuel cask receiving and handling at the
encapsulation plant.
2) Hot cell operations, where fuel assemblies are
placed in canisters.
3) Welding and quality control of the canister.
Time schedules of these stages are presented in
Appendix 2. Cask receiving and handling procedu-
res take 3–4 days, hot cell operations are estima-
ted to take 3–4 days (2–3 days in case of dry tran-
sportation) and welding and quality checking of
the canister two days. Since these operations are
parallel, the capacity of the plant can be up to 100
canisters per year (2 per week). Average capacity
needed in Finland is estimated to be 60 canisters
per year.
4.11 Process waste management
The encapsulation process will inevitably produce
some solid and liquid waste. In principle, the only
places where active waste can be produced are in
hot cell and in transport cask decontamination
In the hot cell some crud, deposit and possibly
detached fuel assembly fractions will be vacuum-
cleaned and ultimately shed into the canister.
Spent filters from active ventilation will be
packed in the plastic and deposited into the final
repository. Liquid waste will primarily be formed
in decontamination of transport cask, and it is
piped to the active sewage system, where washing
water is cleaned and circulated. Used filters are
solidified into concrete and deposited into the final
repository.
Equipment, which is removed from the hot cell
for repair or for service, is decontaminated in the
active workshop. Decontamination waste e.g. rags
are placed in barrels, which are deposited in the
final repository. Washing water and decontamina-
tion agents are piped into the active sewage sys-
tem. Equipment, which is not repaired, are
wrapped up in plastic and deposited into the final
repository.
Most waste is generated in decommissioning of
the plant. All equipment in the hot cell is taken
into the repository. Stainless steel lining of the hot
cell will be decontaminated, but they are not
decommissioned. Total amount of process waste
will be about 3000 m3, including decommissioning
waste.
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Figure 10. Cross section of the hot cell (1) and adjacent rooms. Two cylinders (2) under the hot cell are
reservations for drying autoclaves, buffer positions and/or  measurement positions. Cask transport and
receiving area is on the left (3) and canister transfer corridor (4)  is below the hot cell on the right. A
canister shown in the transfer corridor has been docked into its position. Cask docking positions are not
shown in this figure.
Figure 11. Decontamination cell and tomographic inspection station.
Figure 8. Transfer trolley and transfer corridor of the canister.
Figure 9. Hot cell.
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Figure 12. Handling of the canisters in the encapsulation process and tests of inner and outer lids.
Receipt of the canister
Disconnecting the
canister from hot cell
Quality control and
preparation
Opening the inner lid
Attaching to the hot cell
Filling the canister with
assemblies
Closing the inner lid
Weldind the copper lid
of the canister
Ultrasonic inspection
OK?
No
Yes
Decontamination
X-ray tomography
OK?
To buffer storage
Renew
welding?
No
No
Yes
Yes
Opening the inner lid
Filling the canister with
radioactive scrap (if
desired Closing the inner lid
Attaching to the hot cell
Taking the assemblies
out of the canister
Opening the copper lid
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OK? No
Yes
Opening the inner lid
Taking the assemblies
out of the canister
Active waste
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Yes
No
Fixing the seals or
replacing the lid
Disconnecting the
canister from hot cell
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Figure  6. General picture of the Finnish spent fuel encapsulation plant.
Figure 7. Spent fuel receiving and storage area.
This report presents a preliminary, detailed de-
sign of the encapsulation plant envisaged in the
final disposal programme of spent fuel of Posiva
ltd. The design information gives good basis for
design information verification. Possible diversion
scenarios can be identified and guidelines for ini-
5 CONCLUSIONS
tial safeguards approach can be suggested. Revie-
wing the design with present IAEA requirements
for conditioning facility and existing experience of
IAEA and EURATOM will give valuable informa-
tion for further improvements.
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APPENDIX 1 FLOOR PLANS AND ROOM LISTINGS OF THE ENCAPSULATION PLANT
LEVEL –7.20 Room area/m2 Height/m Volume/m3
1. Service corridor 291 3.6 1048
2. Cask transfer corridor 39 7.2 281
3. Component room for hot cell 68 7.2 490
4. Component room 29 7.2 209
5. Stairway 12 10.8 130
6. Canister transfer corridor 144 7.2 1037
7. Decontamination station of canister 30 7.2 216
8. Inspection station of canister 30 7.2 216
9. Buffer storage for canisters 72 14.4 1347
10. Canister transfer corridor 18 7.2 132
11. Canister lift 16 7.2 115
12. Stairway 12 18.0 216
13. Reservation 13 3.6 47
14. Reservation 13 3.6 47
15. Sewage room, clean 38 6.0 228
16. Sewage room, controlled 38 6.0 228
17. Reservation 55 3.6 198
18. Stairway 12 18.0 216
19. Reservation 28 3.6 101
TOTALS 958 — 6499
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 13 14
15
16 17 18 19
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FLOOR PLANS AND ROOM LISTINGS OF THE ENCAPSULATION PLANT APPENDIX 1
LEVEL –3.60 Room area/m2 Height/m Volume/m3
1. Service corridor 291 3.6 1048
2. Reservation 13 3.6 48
3. Reservation 13 3.6 48
4. Switch gear room 38 3.6 137
5  Switch gear room 55 3.6 198
6. Switch gear room 55 3.6 198
7. Reservation 38 3.6 137
8. Reservation 27 3.6 98
TOTALS 476 — 1713
1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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Figure 2. The final repository 500 m below the ground level and spent fuel canister.
Figure 3. The time schedule of Finnish spent fuel disposal project.
2) Spent fuel is allowed to cool for 20–40 years.
The cooling time is needed to facilitate the
encapsulation and disposal process. The
surface temperature of fuel canister must not
exceed 100 °C due to the properties of bentonite
clay used as buffer material in the repository
holes.
3) Spent fuel will be transported to encapsulation
plant.
4) Spent fuel cask is received at the encapsulation
will be plant and placed in the canisters, which
will be closed tightly.
LEVEL 0.00 Room area/m2 Height/m Volume/m3
1. Cask receiving and storage area 444 10.8 4795
2. Storage for new canisters 106 7.2 763
3. Hot cell 116 7.2 835
4. Capsulation process operating room 161 3.6 580
5. Component room of welding chamber 44 3.6 158
6. Welding chamber 46 7.2 331
7. Component room of inspection station 47 3.6 169
8. Bentonite block production plant 79 7.2 569
9. Lift foyer 24 7.2 173
10. Bentonite storage 75 7.2 540
11. Workshop 86 7.2 619
12. Storage 13 3.6 47
13. Storage 13 3.6 47
14. Storage 23 3.6 83
15. Back-up electricity room 58 3.6 209
16. Diesel room 52 3.6 187
17. Storage 27 3.6 97
18. Corridor 90 3.6 324
TOTALS 1504 — 10526
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FLOOR PLANS AND ROOM LISTINGS OF THE ENCAPSULATION PLANT APPENDIX 1
LEVEL +3.60 Room area/m2 Height/m Volume/m3
1. Service corridor 161 3.6 580
2. Service room 95 3.6 342
3. Ventilation room 47 3.6 169
4. Storage 13 3.6 47
5. Storage 13 3.6 47
6. Storage 72 3.6 259
7. Automation room 95 3.6 342
8. Control room 76 3.6 274
9. Storage 45 3.6 162
TOTALS 617 — 2221
1
23
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APPENDIX 1 FLOOR PLANS AND ROOM LISTINGS OF THE ENCAPSULATION PLANT
LEVEL +7.20 Room area/m2 Height/m Volume/m3
1. Corridor 166 3.6 598
2. Decontamination — 3.6 —
3. Process room — 3.6 —
4. Service room — 3.6 —
5. Service room — 3.6 —
6. Ventilation machine room — 3.6 —
7. Ventilation machine room — 3.6 —
8. Elevator machine room 46 3.6 166
9. Storage 27 3.6 97
10. Storage 27 3.6 97
TOTALS 732 — 2635
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TIME SCHEDULES OF ENCAPSULATION PLANT PROCESSES APPENDIX 2
Task and time schedule of spent fuel cask receiving and handling at the encapsulation plant.
Task and time schedule of hot cell operations.
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APPENDIX 2 TIME SCHEDULES OF ENCAPSULATION PLANT PROCESSES
Tasks and time schedule of welding and quality control of the canister.
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TECHNICAL DATA OF ENCAPSULATION PLANT AND ENCAPSULATION PROCESS APPENDIX 3
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APPENDIX 4 WORK PLAN OF THE TASK FINSP C 1184  
“SAFEGUARDS FOR FINNISH SPENT FUEL CONDITIONING PLANT”
Phase I
• Program of back-end of fuel cycle in Finland (interim storage storages – final repository) (STUK)
• Description of preliminary design information of the conditioning plant (Posiva / STUK)
Report 6/1999
Introduction of report to IAEA
Phase II
• IAEA present requirements for conditioning facility (IAEA/STUK)
• Existing relevant IAEA/EURATOM experiences (IAEA/STUK)
• Guidelines for initial SG approach (STUK/IAEA)
Report 12/1999
Phase III
• Initial SG approach (STUK/IAEA)
• Diversion strategy
• Diversion concealment strategy
• Detection point
• Operator systems
• Process system
• Safety system
• QA systems
• Evaluation of initial SG approach (STUK/IAEA)
• Assesment of potential options for initial SG approach (STUK/IAEA)
• Design specification for integrated verification system (STUK/IAEA)
• Design specification for DIV (STUK/IAEA)
Report 5/2000
Phase IV
• Identification of the needs of instrumentation and procedures development (STUK/ IAEA)
• Assessment of cost efficiency and effectiviness (STUK)
Final report 9/2000
